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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This opinion of the in banc court concerns two appeals 
from orders of the United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware that denied habeas corpus petitions filed by two 
state prisoners, William Henry Flamer and Billie Bailey, who were 
separately tried for unrelated double homicides and sentenced to 
death.  The appeals were initially heard by two separate panels 
of this court during roughly the same period.  Both prisoners 
argued, among other things, that their death sentences should be 
vacated pursuant to Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), 
because Delaware, in the parlance of the Supreme Court's Eighth 
Amendment decisions, is a "weighing state" and because the juries 
in both cases were instructed at the penalty phase regarding 
certain statutory aggravating factors that were either 
impermissibly vague or duplicative.  Before a panel opinion was 
filed in either appeal, the court voted to rehear these cases in 
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banc for the purpose of addressing the prisoners' related 
arguments.   
 Agreeing with the two district court judges who denied 
the prisoners' petitions and with the unanimous Supreme Court of 
Delaware, we now hold that Delaware is not a "weighing state," 
that Clemons is therefore inapplicable, and that the governing 
Supreme Court precedent is Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
Applying Zant, we hold that the strikingly similar jury 
instructions and interrogatories used in these two cases did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  We also find no merit in Bailey's 
remaining arguments.  In this opinion, we do not address Flamer's 
many other arguments, but in a separate opinion that is being 
filed simultaneously with this opinion, the panel that originally 
heard Flamer's appeal rejects all of Flamer's other arguments. 
Accordingly, the district court orders in both cases will be 
affirmed.   
  
I. 
 A.  The background of Flamer's appeal is set out in the 
panel opinion that is being filed together with this opinion, and 
therefore a detailed statement is not needed here.  Flamer was 
arrested in 1979 for murdering his elderly aunt and uncle during 
a robbery at their home.  In early 1980, he was tried and 
convicted on four charges of first-degree murder: two charges of 
intentionally causing the death of another person, Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11 § 636(a)(1), and two charges of felony murder, Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2).  He was also found guilty of other 
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non-capital offenses.  After the jury returned these verdicts, 
the state sought the imposition of the death penalty.   
 At the time of Flamer's trial,0 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 4209(d)(1) provided in pertinent part as follows: 
 A sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the jury or judge, where appropriate, 
finds: 
 
 a.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 
statutory aggravating circumstance; and 
 
 b.  Unanimously recommends, after 
weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation 
or mitigation which bears upon the particular 
circumstances or details of the commission of 
the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender, that a sentence 
of death be imposed. 
 
See Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 146 (Del. 1983).  Nineteen 
statutory aggravating circumstances were listed in Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1).0  In addition, the statute provided that a 
                     
0The language of this provision today is substantially the same: 
 
A sentence of death shall be imposed, after 
considering the recommendation of the jury, 
if a jury is impaneled, if the Court finds: 
 
 a.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 
statutory aggravating circumstance; and 
 
 b.  By a preponderance of the evidence, 
after weighing all relevant evidence in 
aggravation or mitigation which bears upon 
the particular circumstances or details of 
the commission of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender, 
that the aggravating circumstances found by 
the Court to exist outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances found by the Court to exist. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (Supp. 1994). 
0These were: 
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 a.  The murder was committed by a person in, or 
who has escaped from, the custody of a law-enforcement 
officer or place of confinement. 
 
 b.  The murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing an arrest or for the purpose of 
effecting an escape from custody. 
 
 c.  The murder was committed against any law-
enforcement officer, corrections employee or fireman, 
while such victim was engaged in the performance of his 
official duties. 
 
 d.  The murder was committed against a judicial 
officer, a former judicial officer, Attorney General, 
former Attorney General, Assistant or Deputy Attorney 
General or former Assistant or Deputy Attorney general, 
State Detective or former State Detective, Special 
Investigator or former Special Investigator, during, or 
because of, the exercise of his official duty. 
 
 e.  The murder was committed against a person who 
was held or otherwise detained as a shield or hostage. 
 
 f.  The murder was committed against a person who 
was held or detained by the defendant for ransom or 
reward. 
 
 g.  The murder was committed against a person who 
was a witness to a crime and who was killed for the 
purpose of preventing his appearance or testimony in 
any grand jury, criminal or civil proceeding involving 
such crime. 
 
 h.  The defendant paid or was paid by another 
person or had agreed to pay or be paid by another 
person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another 
person for the killing of the victim. 
 
 i.  The defendant was previously convicted of 
another murder or manslaughter or of a felony involving 
the use of, or threat of, force or violence upon 
another person. 
 
 j.  The murder was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, 
or flight after committing or attempting to commit any 
degree of rape, arson, kidnapping, robbery, sodomy or 
burglary. 
8 
statutory aggravating circumstance would be deemed to have been 
established if a defendant was convicted under certain 
subsections of the Delaware first-degree murder statute, Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2)-(7).0  Thus, under these 
                                                                  
 
 k.  The defendant's course of conduct resulted in 
the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths are a 
probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 
 
 l.  The murder was committed by means of torture, 
use of an explosive device or poison, or the defendant 
used such means on the victim prior to murdering him. 
 
 m.  The defendant caused or directed another to 
commit murder or committed murder as an agent or 
employee of another person. 
 
 n.   The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman. 
 
 o.  The defendant was under a sentence of life 
imprisonment, whether for natural life or otherwise, at 
the time the commission of the murder. 
 
 p.  The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 
 
 q.  The victim was pregnant. 
 
 r.  The victim was severely handicapped, severely 
disabled or elderly. 
 
 s.  The victim was defenseless. 
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a) provided: 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of murder in the first degree 
when: 
 
 (1)  He intentionally causes the death 
of another person; 
 
 (2)  In the course of and in furtherance 
of the commission or attempted commission of 
a felony or immediate flight therefrom, he 
recklessly causes the death of another 
person; 
 
9 
provisions, a Delaware jury at the penalty phase of a capital 
case was required to perform two steps.  In the first step, which 
we will hereafter call the "eligibility" step, the jury was 
required to determine whether at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance had been (or was deemed to have been) proven.  In 
the second step, which we will call the "selection" step, the 
jury was required to weigh all of the pertinent evidence in 
aggravation (not just the statutory aggravating circumstances) 
and all of the evidence in mitigation. 
                                                                  
 (3)  He intentionally causes another 
person to commit suicide by force or duress; 
 
 (4)  He recklessly causes the death of a 
law enforcement officer, corrections employee 
or fireman while such officer is in the 
lawful performance of his duties; 
 
 (5)  He causes the death of another 
person by the use of or detonation of any 
bomb or similar destructive device; 
 
 (6)  He, with criminal negligence, 
causes the death of another person in the 
course of and in furtherance of the 
commission or attempted commission of rape, 
kidnapping, arson in the first degree, 
robbery in the first degree, or immediate 
flight therefrom; 
 
 (7)  He causes the death of another 
person in order to avoid or prevent the 
lawful arrest of any person, or in the course 
of and in furtherance of the commission or 
attempted commission of escape in the second 
degree or escape after conviction 
 
Thus, if a defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under 
subsection (1) -- for "intentionally causing the death of another 
person" -- no statutory aggravating circumstance would 
automatically be deemed to have been established.  However, if a 
defendant was convicted under subsections (2)-(7), a statutory 
aggravating circumstance would be deemed to have been proven. 
10 
 In Flamer's case, a statutory aggravating circumstance 
was deemed to have been established by virtue of his convictions 
on two charges of felony murder (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§636(a)(2)).  See supra pages 4-5.  In addition, the prosecution 
argued that three other statutory aggravating circumstances had 
been proven, namely, (1) that Flamer's conduct had "resulted in 
the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths [were] a 
probable consequence of [that] conduct,"0 (2) that the murders 
were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman,"0  and 
(3) that the murders were committed "for pecuniary gain."0  The 
prosecution urged the jury to impose the death sentence based on 
these circumstances and certain non-statutory aggravating 
factors, including Flamer's prior criminal record, the age of his 
two victims, the frailty of his aunt, and Flamer's exploitation 
of his aunt and uncle's trust in order to gain entrance to their 
home.  Flamer Joint Appendix ("JA") at 1485-86.  The jury was 
given instructions that are discussed in detail in Part III of 
this opinion.  The jury then returned a verdict recommending0 
that a sentence of death be imposed.  On a special interrogatory 
form, which is also discussed in detail in Part III, the jury 
found that all three of the additional statutory aggravating 
circumstances alleged by the prosecution had been established, 
                     
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)k. 
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)n. 
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)p. 
0Although the Delaware statute described the jury's decision as a 
"recommendation," this decision, if supported by the evidence, 
was "binding on the Court."  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§4209(d)(1)b. 
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and the jury indicated that it had relied on all of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances in making its recommendation. 
 Shortly after this verdict was returned, the United 
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), which concerned the Georgia 
sentencing scheme, upon which, according to the Supreme Court of 
Delaware, the Delaware scheme "was obviously fashioned."  State 
v. White, 395 A.2d 1082, 1085 (Del. 1978).   Under the Georgia 
scheme, like the Delaware scheme, the jury was first required to 
determine whether at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
had been proven.  See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 871.  If the 
jury found that such a circumstance had been shown, the jury was 
then called upon to consider all pertinent aggravating and 
mitigating evidence in determining whether a death sentence 
should be imposed.  Id. at 871-72.   
 In Godfrey, the defendant had killed his wife and 
mother-in-law "instantly" by shooting them in the head with a 
shotgun.  446 U.S. at 425.  In sentencing the defendant to death, 
the jury found one statutory aggravating factor to have been 
proven, i.e., that the murders were "outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that [they] involved torture, 
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."  Id. 
at 426.  The jury found that this statutory aggravating factor 
had been proven even though the prosecution had not claimed that 
the murders had involved "torture" or an "aggravated battery" 
(other than the homicides themselves) and even though the jury's 
answers on a sentencing questionnaire indicated that neither 
12 
torture nor an aggravated battery (other than the murders) had 
been found.  Id. 
 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, 
but the United States Supreme Court reversed.  In the plurality 
opinion that embodied the Court's holding,0 Justice Stewart 
observed that a valid capital sentencing scheme "must channel the 
sentencer's discretion by `clear and objective standards' that 
provide `specific and detailed guidance,' and that `make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death.'"  Id. at 428 (footnotes omitted).  The plurality 
concluded that the challenged statutory aggravating circumstance, 
as apparently interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Godfrey, did not fulfill this requirement.  The plurality wrote: 
 In the case before us, the Georgia 
Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of 
death based upon no more than a finding that 
the offense was "outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible and inhuman."  There is 
nothing in these few words, standing alone, 
that implies any inherent restraint on the 
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the 
death sentence.  A person of ordinary 
sensibility could fairly characterize almost 
every murder as "outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible and inhuman."  Such a view 
may, in fact, have been one to which the 
members of the jury in this case subscribed. 
 
                     
0Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was joined by three other 
justices.  Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred 
in the judgment.   Justice Marshall "agree[d] with the plurality 
that, as applied in this case, [the aggravated circumstance at 
issue was] unconstitutionally vague," 426 U.S. at 435 (Marshall, 
J., concurring in the judgment), but he also expressed the view 
that reversal was required on broader grounds.  Id. at 433, 435-
42. 
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Id. at 428-29 (footnote omitted).  The plurality opinion 
subsequently added that there was "no principled way to 
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, 
from the many cases in which it was not."  Id. at 433. 
 Following this decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
in Petition of State for Writ, 433 A.2d 325 (1981), held that the 
statutory aggravating circumstance set out in Del. Code Ann. tit. 
11, § 4209(e)(1)n -- that "[t]he murder was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" -- was, like its Georgia 
counterpart, too vague to channel a sentencer's discretion in a 
capital case.  As previously noted, this circumstance was found 
by the jury in Flamer's case, but three other statutory 
aggravating circumstances had also been proven.  Thus, in 
Flamer's direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware was 
required to decide whether the jury's reliance on one vague 
statutory aggravating circumstance necessitated the reversal of 
Flamer's death sentence, even though other statutory aggravating 
circumstances had also been proven.   
 While Flamer's direct appeal was pending, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Zant v. 
Stephens, supra,  which again involved the Georgia capital 
sentencing scheme.0  In Zant, the jury had found that three 
statutory aggravating circumstances had been proven, and it had 
imposed a sentence of death.  462 U.S. at 866-67.  One of these 
statutory aggravating circumstances was subsequently held by the 
                     
0Zant is discussed in greater detail below.  See infra pages 20-
25. 
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Georgia Supreme Court to be too vague to satisfy the standard 
adopted in Godfrey.  See id. at 867.  Nevertheless, the United 
States Supreme Court held that reversal of the death sentence in 
Zant was not required.  The Court, however, specifically reserved 
decision as to whether its holding would apply in so-called 
"weighing states," which have a capital sentencing scheme 
significantly different from Georgia's.  Id. at 890.   
 After carefully analyzing the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Zant and related cases, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware held that Flamer's sentence should be upheld.  Flamer v. 
State, 490 A.2d at 131-36.  The Supreme Court of Delaware held 
that Delaware is not a "weighing state" and wrote: 
While the jury in Delaware is told to weigh 
and consider certain circumstances, the fact 
that they are not told how to weigh them and 
that this "weighing" occurs at the 
discretionary stage, renders defendant's 
argument meaningless. 
Id. at 135-36.   The Delaware Supreme Court further found that 
the instructions had not placed excessive emphasis on the vague 
statutory circumstance and that the references to that 
circumstance were harmless.  Id. at 136.  Responding to Flamer's 
argument that two of the statutory aggravating factors -- that 
the murders were committed during the felony of robbery and that 
the murders were committed for pecuniary gain were duplicative --
the Delaware Supreme Court likewise observed that "nowhere did 
the trial court suggest `that the presence of more than one 
aggravating circumstance should be given special weight.'"  490 
A.2d at 136 (quoting Zant, 461 U.S. at 891). 
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   In his federal habeas corpus petition, Flamer renewed 
his argument that the jury's finding of one invalid statutory 
aggravating circumstance required the reversal of his death 
sentence, but the district court agreed with the analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Delaware.  Flamer v. Chaffinch, 827 F. Supp. 
1079, 1094-97 (D. Del. 1993).  This appeal followed. 
 
 B.  Bailey committed the two murders for which he was 
sentenced to death while assigned to the Plummer House, a work 
release facility in Wilmington, Delaware.   Bailey v. Snyder, 855 
F. Supp. 1392, 1396-97 (D. Del. 1993).  After escaping from the 
Plummer House, Bailey appeared at the home of his foster sister, 
Sue Ann Coker, in Cheswold, Delaware.  Id. at 1397.  Bailey told 
his foster sister that he was upset and was not going back to the 
Plummer House.  Id.  A short time later, Bailey and Charles 
Coker, his foster sister's husband, left in Coker's truck to run 
an errand.  Id.  On the way, Bailey asked Coker to stop at a 
package store.  Id.  Bailey then entered the store and robbed the 
clerk at gunpoint.  Id.  Emerging from the store with a pistol in 
one hand and a bottle in the other, Bailey told Coker that the 
police would soon be arriving, and he asked to be dropped at 
Lambertson's Corner, about one and one-half miles away.  Id. 
Coker complied and then drove back to the scene of the robbery, 
where he inquired about the clerk and telephoned the Delaware 
State Police.  Id. 
 In the meantime, Bailey had entered the farmhouse of 
Gilbert Lambertson, age 80, and his wife, Clara Lambertson, age 
16 
73.  Id.  Bailey shot Gilbert Lambertson twice in the chest with 
a pistol and once in the head with the Lambertsons' shotgun.  Id. 
at 1392.  He shot Clara Lambertson once in the shoulder with the 
pistol and once in the abdomen and once in the neck with the 
shotgun.  Id.  Both Lambertsons died.  Id. 
 Bailey fled from the scene but was spotted by a 
Delaware State Police helicopter unit as he ran across the 
Lambertsons' field.  Id.  He attempted to shoot the helicopter 
co-pilot with the pistol, but he was apprehended.  Id. 
 Bailey was charged with first-degree murder and other 
offenses, and he was tried at approximately the same time as 
Flamer, but before a different judge.  After the jury found 
Bailey guilty, the state sought the death penalty.  Bailey v. 
State, 490 A.2d 158, 172 (Del. 1983).  The state argued that it 
had established the existence of the following four statutory 
aggravating circumstances:  (1) that the murders were committed 
by one who had escaped from a place of confinement,0 (2) that the 
murders were committed while the defendant was engaged in flight 
after committing a robbery,0 (3) that the defendant's course of 
conduct resulted in the deaths of two people where the deaths 
were a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct,0 and (4) 
that the murders were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, 
or inhuman."0  Id.  The judge gave the jury instructions that 
were virtually identical to those given in Flamer's case.  Id. at 
                     
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)a.     
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)j.      
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)k. 
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)n.      
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173.  The jury then returned a verdict recommending the 
imposition of a death sentence.  On an interrogatory form that is 
also virtually the same as that used in Flamer's case, the jury 
indicated that it had found that all four of the alleged 
statutory factors had been proven.  See Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F. 
Supp. at 1409.  The jury further indicated that, in recommending 
a death sentence, it had relied on two of those circumstances -- 
that the defendant's conduct had resulted in the deaths of two 
persons where the deaths were a probable consequence of the 
defendant's conduct and that the murders were outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman. Id. 
 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
considered whether Bailey's death sentences had to be vacated 
because the jury had found the existence of one invalid statutory 
aggravating circumstances (i.e., that the murders were 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or unhuman").  Bailey 
v. State, 490 A.2d at 172-74.  The Delaware Supreme Court handed 
down its decisions regarding the death sentences in Flamer's and 
Bailey's cases on the same day.  In Bailey's case, the State 
Supreme Court relied on its analysis in its Flamer opinion and 
affirmed Bailey's death sentence.  Id. at 173-74. 
 Bailey subsequently filed the federal habeas petition 
that is now before us and argued, among other things, that the 
jury's finding of a single invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstance required the reversal of his death sentence.  Bailey 
v. Snyder, 855 F. Supp. at 1408.  Bailey's petition was assigned 
to a different district court judge from Flamer's, but the judge 
18 
in Bailey's case reached the same conclusion as the judge in 
Flamer's.  Agreeing with the Supreme Court of Delaware that 
Delaware is a "non-weighing state" and that Zant is the governing 
precedent, the district court held that the Bailey jury's finding 
of a single invalid statutory aggravating circumstance did not 
require the reversal of Bailey's death sentence.  Id. at 1408-11. 
Bailey then took this appeal. 
 
II. 
 A.  On appeal, both Flamer and Bailey argue that 
Delaware is a "weighing" state; that Clemons v. Mississippi, 
supra, not Zant, is therefore the pertinent Supreme Court 
precedent; and that under Clemons the juries' reliance on one or 
more invalid statutory aggravating circumstances means that their 
death sentences cannot stand unless there is a judicial 
reweighing of the evidence without consideration of the invalid 
circumstances or unless it is determined that the juries' 
consideration of those circumstances was harmless.  In order to 
assess these arguments, it is necessary to explain the difference 
between what the Supreme Court has termed "weighing" and "non-
weighing" states.   
 
 B.  At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), "sentencing juries had 
almost complete discretion in determining whether a given 
defendant would be sentenced to death . . . ."  Johnson v. Texas, 
113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1993).  "The guiding principle that 
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emerged from Furman was that the States were required to channel 
the discretion of sentencing juries in order to avoid a system in 
which the death penalty would be imposed in a `wanto[n]' and 
`freakis[h]' manner."  Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in 
original).  Since then, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said 
that a state's capital sentencing scheme "must genuinely narrow 
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on 
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."  Zant, 
462 U.S. at 877; see also Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 
2630, 2634 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542 (1993); 
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.  This narrowing is typically 
achieved by permitting the imposition of a death sentence only if 
the trier of fact finds at either the guilt or penalty phase that 
at least one statutorily specified aggravating circumstance has 
been proven.  See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634;  Lewis v. 
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 
U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990).  Such a finding makes a defendant 
"`eligible' for the death penalty."  See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 
2634; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774.   
 Because the aggravating factors listed in a state's 
capital sentencing statute perform this critical narrowing 
function, the Supreme Court has insisted that these factors be 
defined with some precision, for if they are too vague they can 
leave "the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid 
in Furman."  Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).  As 
previously explained, it was for this reason that the Court held 
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that the circumstance at issue in Godfrey -- whether the murders 
were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" --  was 
inadequate to channel the jury's eligibility determination.  In 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 362, the Court subsequently 
reached the same conclusion with respect to the circumstance of 
whether the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."   
Although the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances at 
issue in Godfrey and Maynard refer to underlying considerations 
that may properly be taken into account in deciding whether a 
death sentence should be imposed, their flaw is that they do not 
adequately narrow the factfinder's discretion in determining 
whether a defendant should be found to be eligible for a death 
sentence.  See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62; Zant, 462 U.S. at 
885-89.   
 "Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within 
the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the 
death penalty," a state is free to allow "the jury . . . to 
consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the 
appropriate punishment."  California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 
(1983).  A state must permit the factfinder to consider all 
mitigating evidence.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 
(1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).  But a 
state has considerable leeway with respect to the role of 
aggravating factors at this stage.  One permissible method is 
exemplified by the Georgia sentencing scheme at issue in Zant v. 
Stephens.  Another permissible method is exemplified by the 
scheme discussed in Clemons v. Mississippi. 
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 C.  Zant, as previously noted, involved the Georgia 
capital sentencing scheme.  Under that scheme, as described by 
the Georgia Supreme Court in response to a question certified 
from the Supreme Court of the United States, the factfinder at 
the penalty phase was first required to determine whether at 
least one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by statute 
was present.  See 462 U.S. at 870-72.  If the factfinder found at 
least one of these circumstances, the factfinder was then 
required to "`consider[] all evidence in extenuation, mitigation 
and aggravation of punishment.'"  Id. at 871 (quoting 297 S.E.2d 
1, 3-4 (1982)). 
 In Zant, after the defendant, Stephens, was found 
guilty of murder, the state requested that the jury impose the 
death penalty and argued that the following aggravating 
circumstances listed in the Georgia statute were present:  (1)(a) 
that the defendant had "a prior record of conviction for a 
capital felony" or (b) "a substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions"; (2) that the offense was 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it 
involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the 
victim"; and (3) that the defendant had escaped from lawful 
custody or confinement.  Id. at 865 n.1.  The jury imposed the 
death penalty and stated that it had found the presence of the 
aggravating circumstances labeled above as (1)(a) (that the 
defendant had a prior conviction for a capital felony), (1)(b) 
(that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal 
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convictions), and (3) (that he had escaped from lawful custody or 
confinement).  Id. at 866-67. 
 The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently held in another 
case, Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 541-42 (Ga. 1976), that 
circumstance (1)(b) -- a "substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions" -- was unlawfully vague for 
Eighth Amendment purposes.  In light of this decision, the 
Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the jury's finding of 
this improper aggravating circumstance rendered Stephens's death 
sentence invalid.  The court concluded that it did not, because 
the other circumstances found by the jury adequately supported 
Stephens's sentence.  See Stephens v. State, 237 S.E.2d 259, 261-
62, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1978); Stephens v. Hopper, 247 
S.E.2d 92, 97-98, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). 
 The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the jury's 
consideration of this circumstance rendered Stephens's sentence 
unconstitutional.  Among other things, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the reference to this factor in the jury 
instructions "may have unduly directed the jury's attention to 
[Stephens's] prior convictions."  Stephens v. Zant, 648 F.2d 446 
(5th Cir. 1981).  The Fifth Circuit added that it could not be 
"determined with the degree of certainty required in capital 
cases that the instruction did not make a critical difference in 
the jury's decision to impose the death penalty."  Id. 
 The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court noted that the 
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance played a limited 
role under the Georgia scheme.  Such a finding "narrow[ed] the 
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class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the 
death penalty" but did not thereafter "play any role in guiding 
the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion."  462 U.S. 
at 874.  Concluding that this scheme sufficiently structured the 
sentencer's discretion, the Court wrote: 
Our cases indicate . . . that statutory 
aggravating circumstances play a 
constitutionally necessary function at the 
stage little difference between such an 
instruction and the one actually given.  Id.  
The Court thus commented that "[t]he effect 
the erroneous instruction may have had on the 
jury is tactors in the process of selecting, 
from among that class, those defendants who 
will actually be sentenced to death.  
 
Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
 The Court then considered whether, under this scheme, 
the jury's finding of one vague statutory aggravating 
circumstance necessitated the reversal of Stephens's death 
sentence even though other valid statutory aggravating 
circumstances were also found.  The Court held that it did not. 
After noting that the jury had "found aggravating circumstances 
that were valid and legally sufficient to support the death 
penalty,"  id. at 881, the Court rejected Stephens's argument 
that reversal was necessary because the trial judge's 
instructions concerning the invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstance "may have affected the jury's deliberations," id. at 
885.  The Court wrote: 
In analyzing this contention it is essential 
to keep in mind the sense in which that 
aggravating circumstance is `invalid.'  It is 
not invalid because it authorizes the jury to 
draw adverse inferences from conduct that is 
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constitutionally protected. . . .  Georgia 
[has not] attached the `aggravating' label to 
factors that are constitutionally 
impermissible or totally irrelevant to the 
sentencing process, such as for example the 
race, religion, or political affiliation of 
the defendant, . . . or to conduct that 
actually should militate in favor of a lesser 
penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's 
mental illness. 
 
Id. at 885 (citations omitted).  Rather, the Court observed, the 
circumstance in question had been found to be invalid because it 
failed "to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder 
case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases 
in which such a penalty may not be imposed."  Id. at 886.  But 
the Court pointed out that "[t]he underlying evidence [was] 
nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase."  Id.   
 Responding to the Fifth Circuit's statement that the 
judge's instruction "may have unduly directed the jury's 
attention to [Stephens's] prior conviction," the Supreme Court 
assumed that the instruction had in fact "induc[ed] the jury to 
place greater emphasis upon the [defendant's] prior criminal 
record than it would otherwise have done."  Id. at 888.  The 
Court held, however, that this emphasis had not violated 
Stephens's constitutional rights.  The Court stated that it would 
have been constitutional for the trial judge to instruct the jury 
that "it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's 
prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination," 
id., and the Court saw little difference between such an 
instruction and the one actually given.  Id.  The Court thus 
commented that "[t]he effect the erroneous instruction may have 
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had on the jury is therefore merely a consequence of the 
statutory label `aggravating circumstance.'"  Id.  While "[t]hat 
label arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat 
greater weight to [the defendant's] prior criminal record than it 
otherwise would have given," the Court observed, "any possible 
impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in 
the sentencing process."  Id. at 888-89 (emphasis added).  In 
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court withheld opinion 
"concerning the possible significance of a holding that a 
particular aggravating circumstance is `invalid' under a 
statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically 
instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the 
death penalty."  Id. at 890. 
 
 D.  The Court considered a sentencing scheme of this 
latter type in Clemons v. Mississippi, supra.  Under the 
Mississippi scheme, like the Georgia scheme, the factfinder at 
the penalty phase of a capital case was first required to find 
the presence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. 
See 494 U.S. at 744-45.  But the two schemes differed with 
respect to the next step that the factfinder was instructed to 
perform.  Whereas the Georgia scheme called for the factfinder to 
consider all aggravating evidence, the Mississippi scheme 
required the factfinder to consider only those aggravating 
elements enumerated in the statute and to weigh those elements 
against the mitigating circumstances.  See id. at 743 n.1, 745 
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n.2.  The Clemons Court -- employing terminology that can be 
quite misleading in the context of the cases now before us --
described Mississippi as a "weighing" state because its statute 
called for the jury to "weigh" the statutory aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.  See id. at 
748-49.  
 In Clemons, the jury found the presence of two 
statutorily defined aggravating factors -- that the murder was 
committed during a robbery for pecuniary gain and that the murder 
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."  Id. at 742. 
Concluding that these factors outweighed any mitigating 
circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of death.  Id.   The 
second of the statutory aggravating factors was later held to be 
unconstitutionally vague for Eighth Amendment purposes.  See 
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.  Noting that Mississippi was a 
"weighing state" and that the jury had weighed this statutory 
factor in imposing a death sentence, the Court vacated that 
sentence and remanded for the Mississippi Supreme Court to 
determine whether the remaining valid statutory aggravating 
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances or to 
conduct a harmless error review.  See 494 U.S. at 741.   
 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has provided 
explanations of the reasoning on which the holding in Clemons 
rests.  For example, in Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2119 
(1992), the Court explained:0 
                     
0Similarly, in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992), the 
Court observed that "[i]n a nonweighing state, so long as the 
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In a weighing state . . . there is Eighth 
Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an 
"invalid" aggravating circumstance in 
reaching the ultimate decision to impose a 
death sentence.  See Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 
L.ed.2d 725 (1990).  Employing an invalid 
aggravating factor in the weighing process 
"creates the possibility . . . of 
randomness," Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 
____, _____, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 117 
L.ed.2d 367 (1992), by placing a "thumb [on] 
death's side of the scale," id. at ______, 
112 S. Ct. at 1137, thus "creat[ing] the risk 
[of] treat[ing] the defendant as more 
deserving of the death penalty," id. at 
_____, 112 S. Ct. at 1139.  Even when other 
valid aggravating factors exist as well, 
merely affirming a sentence reached by 
weighing an invalid aggravating factor 
deprives a defendant of "the individualized 
treatment that would result from actual 
reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors 
and aggravating circumstances."  Clemons, 
supra, 494 U.S. at 752, 110 S. Ct. at 1450 . 
. . . 
 
 
                                                                  
sentencing body finds at least one valid aggravating factor, the 
fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not 
affect the formal process of deciding whether death is an 
appropriate penalty."  In a "weighing" state, however, the Court 
observed: 
 
[W]hen the sentencing body is told to weigh 
an invalid factor in its decision, a 
reviewing court may not assume it would have 
made no difference if the thumb had been 
removed from death's side of t260* ( (_ the 
death penalty.  On the other hand, those 
juries that concluded that the standard had 
not been met could not consider the 
defendant's prior convictions at all, 
andreceived an individualized sentence.   
 
Id. 
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 E.  In order to illustrate the reason for the 
distinction that the Supreme Court has drawn between "non-
weighing" states like Georgia and "weighing" states like 
Mississippi, it is helpful to compare how the effect of the 
invalid aggravating circumstance in Zant would differ at the 
selection step in the two types of states.  As previously noted, 
the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in Zant was "a 
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." 
Due to its vagueness, this standard created a serious danger that 
different juries would reach different conclusions based on 
identical facts.  If, for example, a defendant had two prior 
convictions, one for a mugging and one for a barroom fight, some 
juries might well conclude that these convictions satisfied the 
standard, while others might well reach the opposite conclusion. 
At the "selection" step in a "non-weighing" state, however, this 
possibility would not carry with it an unacceptably high risk of 
altering the jury's ultimate sentencing decision.  This is so 
because, whether or not the jury found that the standard had been 
met, it would still consider the same underlying facts, i.e., 
that the defendant had one prior conviction for a mugging and one 
for a barroom fight. 
 By contrast, in a "weighing" state, this vague standard 
would create an unacceptably high risk of affecting the jury's 
decision at the selection step.  Those juries that concluded that 
the standard had been met could consider the defendant's prior 
convictions, and this factor might well tip the balance in favor 
of the death penalty.  On the other hand, those juries that 
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concluded that the standard had not been met could not consider 
the defendant's prior convictions at all, and this might well tip 
the balance against the death penalty.   Accordingly, as the 
Supreme Court has put it, "[e]mploying an invalid aggravating 
factor in the weighing process `creates the possibility . . . of 
randomness,' . . . thus `creat[ing] the risk of treat[ing] the 
defendant as more deserving of the death penalty.'"  Sochor, 112 
S. Ct. at 2119 (citations omitted; brackets in original).   
 
 F.  With this background in mind, it seems quite clear 
that Delaware is a "non-weighing" state.  Under the Delaware 
scheme, the jury at the selection step of the penalty phase is 
free to consider all relevant evidence in aggravation.  The jury 
is not restricted to the statutory aggravating factors.  In this 
critical feature, the Delaware scheme mirrors the Georgia capital 
sentencing scheme discussed in Zant and contrasts sharply with 
the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme discussed in Clemons. 
We therefore agree with the analysis of the Delaware Supreme 
Court and the district court judges who denied the petitions that 
are now before us.  See Flamer v. Chaffinch, 827 F. Supp. at 
1095; Bailey v. Snyder, 826 F. Supp. at 822; Flamer v. State, 490 
A.2d at 135. 
 Flamer's and Bailey's argument that Delaware is a 
"weighing" state is no more than a play on the use of the word 
"weigh" in the Delaware statute.  Flamer and Bailey argue that 
Delaware is a weighing state because the Delaware statute states 
that in the "selection" step the jury must "[u]nanimously 
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recommend[], after weighing all relevant evidence . . . that a 
sentence of death be imposed."   Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 
§4209(d)(1)(b) (emphasis added).  They distinguish the Georgia 
statute on the ground that it provided that "the judge shall 
consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for 
it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating 
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the 
following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be 
supported by the evidence . . . ."  See Zant, 462 U.S. at 865 
n.1. (emphasis added).  Flamer and Bailey argue that Delaware is 
a "weighing" state simply because the Delaware statute instructs 
the jury to "weigh" (not consider) aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  See Flamer Br. at 74; Bailey Br. at 64.   
 We reject these arguments. "[T]he difference between a 
weighing State and a non-weighing State is not one of 
`semantics.'"  Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231. "The Supreme Court's 
weighing/non-weighing distinction does not turn simply on whether 
or not the word weighing appears in a state's statute."  Williams 
v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1456, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).  The fact that 
the Delaware statute employs the term "weigh" rather than the 
term "consider" is inconsequential for present purposes.  The 
term "weigh" is defined as meaning "consider or examine for the 
purpose of forming an opinion or coming to a conclusion" and 
"consider carefully esp[ecially] by balancing one . . . thing 
against another in order to make a choice, decision or judgment," 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2593 (1973) 
(emphasis added); similarly, a synonym of "consider" is "weigh." 
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Id. at 483.  Thus, the Delaware legislature's choice of the word 
"weighing" rather than "considering" is of no Eighth Amendment 
significance. 
 
III.  
 A.  Bailey and Flamer next argue that, even if Delaware 
is a "non-weighing" state, their death sentences must 
nevertheless be reversed because of the particular nature of the 
jury instructions and interrogatories used in their cases.  As we 
have mentioned, the instructions and interrogatories given in 
these two cases were virtually identical.  (The relevant portions 
of the instructions and interrogatories in both cases are set out 
in appendices to this opinion.) 
 In both cases, the trial judges, quoting Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1), told the jurors: 
 A sentence of death shall not be imposed 
until the jury finds: 
 
 1.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least 
one statutory aggravating circumstance; and 
 
 2.  Unanimously recommend, after 
weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation 
or mitigation which bears upon the particular 
circumstance or details of the commission of 
the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender, that a sentence 
of death be imposed. 
 
Appendix A, infra, at i (emphasis added); Appendix C, infra, at 
vi (emphasis added).  The judges also told the jurors that 
Delaware law specified certain statutory aggravating 
circumstances and that "[t]he State may likewise offer matters in 
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aggravation besides the statutory aggravating circumstances." 
Appendix A, infra, at i (emphasis added); Appendix C, infra, at 
vi (emphasis added).   
 The judges then listed the statutory aggravating 
circumstances that the state contended had been proven in each 
case, and both judges also pointed out to the juries that their 
verdicts at the guilt phase had already established the existence 
of at least one statutory aggravating factor -- in Flamer's case 
that the murders had occurred during the commission of the felony 
of robbery,0 and in Bailey's case that the defendant had caused 
the death of two persons where the deaths were the probable 
consequences of his conduct.   
 The judges subsequently told the juries:   
 
The law provides that a sentence of death 
shall not be imposed unless you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance and unanimously 
recommend, after weighing all relevant 
evidence in aggravation . . . and mitigation 
which bears upon the particular circumstances 
or details of the commission of the offense 
and the character and propensities of the 
offender, that a sentence of death be 
imposed. 
 
See Appendix A, infra, at ii - iii (emphasis added); Appendix C, 
infra, at vii (emphasis added).  Shortly thereafter, both judges 
reiterated: 
In conclusion, a sentence of death shall not 
be imposed unless you, the jury, find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
established and unanimously recommend a 
sentence of death be imposed after weighing 
                     
0See supra page 9. 
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all relevant evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation which bear upon the particular 
circumstance and details of the commission of 
the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender. 
 
See Appendix A, infra, at iii (emphasis added); Appendix C, 
infra, at viii (emphasis added).   
 The judges then turned to the interrogatory forms that 
were used in both cases.  The first question on these forms 
asked: 
 1.  Does the jury unanimously find that 
the following statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances exist? 
 
See Appendix B, infra, at v; Appendix D, infra, at ix.  This 
question was followed by a list of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, and after each circumstance a spot was provided 
for the jury to check either "Yes" or "No."0  Id.  The judges in 
both cases instructed the juries to check these statutory 
aggravating circumstances if they found them to have been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.  Appendix A, infra, at 
iii-iv; Appendix C, infra, at viii. 
 The second interrogatory question was: 
 2.  Does the jury unanimously recommend 
a sentence of death be imposed? 
 
See Appendix B, infra, at v; Appendix D, infra, at ix.  Under 
this question were spots for the jury to mark "Yes" or "No." Id.  
                     
0In Flamer's case, three statutory aggravating circumstances were 
listed.  One additional circumstance was deemed by statute to 
have been proven as a result of the jury's verdict at the guilt 
phase and was therefore not listed.  See supra page 9.   In 
Bailey's case, four statutory aggravating circumstances were 
listed. 
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 The third and final question -- which is the focal 
point of the arguments concerning the jury instructions and 
interrogatories -- stated: 
 3.  If the jury unanimously recommends 
that a sentence of death be imposed, please 
indicate which statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances were relied 
upon. 
 
See Appendix B, infra, at v; Appendix D, infra, at ix-x.  This 
question, like the first, was followed by a list of statutory 
aggravating circumstances, and spaces were furnished under each 
circumstance for the jury to mark "Yes" or "No."0  Id.  The 
judges in both cases told the juries: 
 If you recommend the death penalty, you 
will then indicate on the written 
interrogatory which statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances . . . you 
relied upon in reaching your decision. 
 
See Appendix A, infra, at iv; Appendix C, infra, at viii.  
 Based on these instructions and interrogatories, two 
separate arguments are made.    
 B.  The initial argument is that, even if the Delaware 
statute "on its face" created a "non-weighing" scheme, jury 
interrogatory #3 and the corresponding portion of the 
instructions converted the Delaware sentencing scheme "as 
applied" into a "de facto" weighing scheme.  (For convenience, we 
will use the term "interrogatory #3" to refer to both the 
interrogatory itself and the corresponding portion of the 
instructions.).  In support of this argument, it is contended 
                     
0In both cases, four statutory aggravating circumstances were 
listed after interrogatory three. 
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that interrogatory #3 mistakenly suggested to the jury that, at 
the selection step, it could not rely on non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances but was limited to those aggravating 
circumstances set out in the Delaware statute.  Accordingly, 
since it is the hallmark of a "weighing" scheme to require the 
jury at the selection step to rely on only the statutory 
aggravating factors, it is argued that interrogatory #3 made the 
Delaware scheme a "de facto" "weighing" scheme "as applied."  We 
disagree with this argument for two reasons. 
 1.  First, we believe that the instructions in both 
cases, when viewed in their entirety, made it quite clear that 
the juries, at the selection step, were free to consider any 
evidence in aggravation and thus were not required to restrict 
their consideration to only the statutory aggravating factors. In 
both cases, the trial judges instructed the juries three times 
that, at the selection step, they were to "weigh[] all relevant 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the 
particular circumstances or details of the commission of the 
offense and the character and propensities of the offender."  
Moreover, written copies of the instructions were given to the 
juries for their use during deliberations in both cases.  Flamer 
JA at 1466; Bailey Tr. of 2/15/80 at 275-76.  At a fourth place 
in the instruction, the juries were told that the state was 
permitted to "offer matters in aggravation besides the statutory 
aggravating circumstances."  Thus, the juries in both cases were 
expressly, unambiguously, and repeatedly told that, at the 
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selection step, they were free to consider non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances.   
 While it is now argued that jury interrogatory #3 
conveyed a conflicting message, it is important to note that this 
interrogatory did not expressly contradict the instructions 
quoted above.  In other words, interrogatory #3 did not expressly 
inform the juries that they could not consider non-statutory 
aggravating evidence.  Instead, as noted, interrogatory #3 merely 
told the juries that, if they unanimously recommended a death 
sentence, they should indicate "which statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances were relied upon."0  The worst that 
can fairly be said of the wording of this interrogatory question 
is that it might be read to suggest that the jury could not 
recommend a death sentence unless it relied, at least in part, on 
a statutory aggravating circumstance.   
 It is, of course, well established that a jury 
instruction may not be judged "`in artificial isolation,' but 
must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole 
and the trial record.'"  Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 
(1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).  The 
same rule, we believe, should apply to a jury interrogatory. 
Therefore, in the cases now before us, we must consider the 
                     
0As noted, the corresponding portion of the instructions stated: 
 
If you recommend the death penalty, you will 
then indicate on the written interrogatory 
which statutory aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances . . . you relied upon in 
reaching your decision. 
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entire charge and interrogatories to determine whether, as a 
result of interrogatory #3, there was a "reasonable likelihood" 
that the jurors were led to believe that they could not consider 
non-statutory aggravating factors at the "selection" step.  See 
Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 482 n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 
370, 380 (1990); Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1247 & n.3 (3d 
Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3036 (1992). 
 As we have noted, the juries were expressly, clearly, 
and repeatedly instructed, orally and in writing, that at the 
"selection" step they were to weigh all relevant evidence in 
aggravation.  We do not think that there was a "reasonable 
likelihood" that the juries, in the face of these express 
instructions, nevertheless inferred from interrogatory #3 that 
they were actually limited to considering the statutory 
aggravating circumstances.  See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. 
Ct. 2419, 2427 (1994) (it is "'the almost invariable assumption 
of the law that jurors follow their instructions'") (quoting 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1982)).  If the jury in 
either case had interpreted interrogatory #3 as implying such a 
restriction -- and thus as directly conflicting with the clear 
and explicit instructions repeatedly given by the trial judges --
the reasonable thing for the jury to have done would have been to 
have asked for clarification on this point.  But no such request 
was made in either case.0 
                     
0It is noteworthy that none of the participants in either trial 
seemed to think that this wording presented any problems. As 
noted, the same interrogatory form was used and the same 
corresponding instructions were given by two different trial 
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 For these reasons, we are convinced that the 
instructions and interrogatories in each case, when viewed in 
their entirety, made it clear that the jury, at the selection 
step, was free to consider all evidence in aggravation, and was 
not limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances.   
 2.  Second, even if this point had not been made clear 
and the juries had been left with the mistaken belief that they 
could consider only the statutory aggravating circumstance at the 
selection step, we are at a loss to understand how this could 
have materially prejudiced these defendants.  It is not claimed 
that interrogatory #3 restricted the juries in their 
consideration of any evidence in mitigation, i.e., any evidence 
that might have been helpful to the defendants.  Instead, it is 
claimed that interrogatory #3 improperly restricted the 
aggravating evidence that the juries could consider.  We can 
understand how an improper restriction on aggravating evidence 
could harm the prosecution, but it simply makes no sense to argue 
that death sentences should be overturned because the juries were 
unduly restricted in their consideration of the evidence 
militating in favor of the death penalty. 
 
 C.  The remaining argument is that the references to 
invalid statutory aggravating circumstances in the instructions 
                                                                  
judges.  The record does not reflect that either Flamer's or 
Bailey's trial counsel objected to the wording of interrogatory 
#3 or the corresponding portion of the instructions.  Moreover, 
although the implication now attributed to interrogatory #3 was 
potentially damaging to the prosecution, the prosecutors did not 
object to this wording in either case.   
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and interrogatories in these two cases violated the Eighth 
Amendment because they led the juries to give much greater weight 
or consideration to the facts underlying the invalid statutory 
aggravating circumstances than those facts would otherwise have 
received.  We see no merit in this argument. 
 In large part, this argument relies on the effect of 
the statutory label "aggravating circumstance," and to this 
extent this contention is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Zant.  There, as previously noted, the Supreme Court 
recognized that such a label "arguably might have caused the jury 
to give somewhat greater weight to petitioner's prior criminal 
record than it otherwise would have given."  462 U.S. at 888. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that "any possible impact" resulting 
from the use of that label "could not fairly be regarded as a 
constitutional defect in the sentencing process."  Id. at 889 
(footnote omitted). 
 While Zant would thus appear to be controlling, it is 
argued that in the cases now before us interrogatory #3, by 
suggesting that the juries could not consider non-statutory 
aggravating factors at the selection step, placed far more 
emphasis on the invalid factors than occurred in Zant.  There 
are, however, at least three fatal flaws in this argument. 
 First, we see no difference of constitutional dimension 
between the directions given to the jury in these cases and those 
given to the jury in Zant.  In the cases now before us, 
interrogatory #3 and the corresponding portion of the 
instructions told the juries that, if they unanimously 
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recommended a death sentence, they should indicate "which 
statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances were relied 
upon."   In Zant, the jury was told: 
If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes 
punishment at death by electrocution, you 
shall designate in writing, signed by the 
foreman, the aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances which you have found to have 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
462 U.S. at 866.    
 Second, as discussed above, we reject the argument that 
the instructions and interrogatories in the cases before us, when 
considered in their entirety, created a "reasonable likelihood" 
that the juries were led to believe that, at the selection step, 
they were not free to consider all evidence in aggravation, as 
opposed to only the statutory aggravating circumstances. 
 Finally, even if the juries had believed that they 
could not consider non-statutory aggravating factors at the 
selection step, this would not have naturally caused the juries 
to give the facts underlying the invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstances any greater weight than those facts would have 
otherwise received.  An example may help to clarify this point. 
Suppose that, at the selection step in a non-weighing state like 
Delaware, there are three items of aggravating evidence.  One 
item does not fall within any of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances; let us say it is a prior history of convictions 
for property crimes.  Another item falls within an 
unobjectionable statutory aggravating circumstance; let us say 
that this item is the killing of more than one person.  The final 
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item falls within a vague statutory aggravating circumstance. Let 
us say that the vague statutory aggravating circumstance is that 
the murders were "heinous," and let us say that the prosecution 
contends that the murders were "heinous" because they were 
carried out in a particularly painful manner.  If the jury in 
this hypothetical case was erroneously led to believe that it 
could not consider non-statutory factors at the selection step, 
the jury would not consider the first item -- the prior history 
of convictions for property crimes.  But we do not understand why 
this unwarranted restriction would result in the jury's giving 
the facts underlying the vague factor -- that the murders were 
allegedly committed in a particularly painful manner -- any 
greater weight than those facts would have otherwise received. 
The jury would consider the second and third statutory factors; 
and as we explicate supra in Part II C, the third factor, because 
it was specific aggravating evidence of the painful manner of 
causing death in this case, would be relevant.  See Zant, 462 
U.S. at 885.  The fact that the jury considered only two of the 
three permissible aggravating factors would not give wundue 
weight to either of the two factors considered; nor would the 
jury consider any impermissible factor.  Id.  Hence, we are 
unpersuaded by the argument that the erroneous message allegedly 
conveyed by interrogatory #3 in the cases before us somehow led 
the juries to give greater weight to the facts underlying the 
invalid statutory aggravating circumstances. 
 For all these reasons, we reject the contention that 
these cases can be distinguished from Zant on the ground that the 
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references in these cases to invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstances led the juries to give much greater weight to the 
facts underlying those circumstances.  On the contrary, we find 
Zant to be controlling, and we therefore reject the petitioners' 
arguments.0 
 
IV. 
 We now turn to Bailey's additional arguments.0  We will 
first discuss those that concern the guilt phase of his trial, 
and will then address those that pertain to the penalty phase. 
 
 A.  Guilt Phase. 
  1.  Bailey first argues that the trial court 
violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury by denying 
his request for a change of venue due to prejudicial pretrial 
publicity in Kent County, where the murders occurred.  Bailey 
does not contend that any of the jurors who sat on his case were 
biased or that the trial judge erred in denying any challenges 
for cause.   Rather, Bailey maintains that "the publicity in this 
case . . . combined with widespread contact by members of the 
                     
0While we do not find constitutional error in these cases, we 
strongly disapprove of the practice of a judge in a non-weighing 
state using a jury interrogatory that asks which statutory 
aggravating circumstance the jury "relied upon" in recommending 
the death penalty.  Because statutory aggravating circumstances 
have no special significance at the "selection" phase, such an 
interrogatory is potentially misleading and injects unnecessary 
confusion into the jury's deliberations. 
0As noted, Flamer's other arguments are addressed in a separate 
panel opinion that is being filed simultaneously with this 
opinion. 
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[venire] prior to trial resulted in . . . such a `wave of public 
passion' that made a fair trial unlikely in Kent County no matter 
the record assurances of impartiality of the twelve jurors who 
decided Bailey's fate."  Bailey Br. at 31. 
 Bailey's argument relies chiefly on Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717 (1961), which "held that adverse pretrial publicity can 
create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the 
jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be 
believed."  Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984).  Irvin, 
however, was a case involving "extraordinary publicity," Mu'Min 
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991), that had a remarkably 
prejudicial effect on the minds of potential jurors.  See id. at 
428.  In order to invoke Irvin's presumption of prejudice, "[t]he 
community and media . . . reaction must have been so hostile and 
so pervasive as to make it apparent that even the most careful 
voir dire process would be unable to assure an impartial jury." 
Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d at 1252.  "Such cases are exceedingly 
rare."  Id. at 1253.  See also United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 
963, 972 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It is the rare case in which adverse 
pretrial publicity will create a presumption of prejudice that 
overrides the jurors' assurances that they can be impartial."). 
 The record in this case falls far short of satisfying 
the Irvin standard.  In support of his motion for a change of 
venue, Bailey relied on a series of articles in the Delaware 
State News that appeared between May 22, 1979, the day after the 
murders, and June 13, 1979.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
accurately characterized these stories as follows: 
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[T]he articles were indisputably factual in 
nature, but prejudicial and inflammatory only 
to the extent arising from the normal and 
natural reaction to any purely factual news 
item about a very serious crime. 
 
490 A.2d at 162.  In addition, as the Delaware Supreme Court 
noted, many of the stories centered, not so much on Bailey or the 
facts of the murders, but on the political controversy about the 
work release program.  See Bailey Joint Appendix ("Bailey JA") at 
247, 250, 252, 254, 255, 258.  We have read the articles on which 
Bailey relied, and we conclude that they are neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively comparable to the publicity in 
Irvin.  Indeed, the pretrial publicity in this case was clearly 
no more extensive or prejudicial than that in cases such as 
Mu'Min,0 Patton,0 Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1974), and 
United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 995-96 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980), in which no presumption of 
prejudice was found. 
 It is also significant that there was a lapse of eight 
months between the publication of the last newspaper story on 
which Bailey relied (June 13, 1979) and the start of jury 
selection (February 12, 1980).  "That time soothes and erases is 
a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all."  Patton, 467 
U.S. at 1034.  In Murphy, the Supreme Court noted that extensive 
publicity had stopped about seven months before jury selection 
and found no presumption of prejudice.  421 U.S. at 802.  See 
                     
0See 500 U.S. at 418-19. 
0See Yount v. Patton, 710 F.2d 956, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 
467 U.S. 1025 (1984). 
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also Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035 n.11.  In this case, the Delaware 
Supreme Court appropriately reached a similar conclusion.  490 
A.2d at 162.   
 Finally, the effect of the publicity in this case on 
the members of the venire was not at all comparable to that in 
Irvin -- or even in Patton.  "In Irvin, the trial court excused 
over half of a panel of 430 persons because their opinions of the 
defendant's guilt were so fixed that they could not be impartial, 
and 8 of the 12 jurors who sat had formed an opinion as to 
guilt."  Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 428.  In Patton, "all but 2 of the 
163 veniremen questioned about the case had heard of it," "77% . 
. . admitted they would carry an opinion into the jury box," and 
"8 of the 14 jurors and alternates actually seated admitted that 
at some time they had formed an opinion as to [the defendant's] 
guilt."  467 U.S. at 1029. 
 In this case, Bailey cannot show that the pretrial 
publicity or the community familiarity with the case had any 
comparable effect on the members of the venire.  The most that 
Bailey claims is that about one-half of the venirepersons 
answered in the affirmative when they were asked a group of eight 
questions touching on many matters in addition to familiarity 
with the case.0  Moreover, only one juror and one alternate were 
taken from the group of venirepersons who answered any of these 
                     
0These questions concerned the venirepersons' bias for or against 
the defendant, as well as their familiarity with the case, the 
defendant, the attorneys, the prospective witnesses, the victims 
and their family members, and any employees of a police agency or 
the state Attorney General's office.  See 855 F. Supp. at 1406.   
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questions in the affirmative; neither of these two individuals 
expressed any familiarity with the case; and Bailey did not move 
to excuse either for cause.  See 855 F. Supp. at 1407-08. 
 For these reasons, we hold that no presumption of 
prejudice is justified in this case and that the trial judge's 
denial of Bailey's motion for a change of venue did not violate 
Bailey's constitutional right to an impartial jury. 
  2.  Bailey next contends that his constitutional 
right to due process was violated as a result of improper 
statements made by the prosecution during closing argument at the 
guilt phase of his trial.  The district court analyzed this 
argument at length and concluded that it did not provide a basis 
for granting the writ.  See 855 F. Supp. at 1402-04.  We are in 
essential agreement with the district court's analysis. 
 Bailey did not raise this argument at trial, and when 
he first raised it during the state post-conviction proceedings, 
it was found to have been procedurally defaulted under state law. 
See Bailey JA at 19-24, 37a.  Thus, federal habeas review of this 
claim is barred unless Bailey can "demonstrate cause for the 
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation 
of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the 
claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991). 
 Bailey contends that he demonstrated "cause" because 
his trial attorneys' failure to object at trial violated his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel 
pursuant to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
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U.S. 668 (1984).  Such a violation would provide "cause," see 
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, but we agree 
with the district court, 855 F. Supp. at 1402-04, and the state 
Superior Court, Bailey JA at 23, that Bailey has not shown that 
his experienced attorneys were constitutionally deficient.  One 
of these attorneys, Howard Hillis, testified that he decided not 
to object at trial for strategic reasons; this explanation was 
credited by the Superior Court, Bailey JA at 22; and that finding 
is binding on us in this proceeding.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(d).  
In addition, as the district court observed: 
[I]t was objectively reasonable for Hillis to 
conclude that the prosecutor's acerbic 
comments undermined the State's case more 
than they hurt Bailey's case.  It was also 
objectively reasonable for Hillis to respond 
to the prosecutor's remarks by addressing 
them in his own closing argument rather than 
by making an objection, as Hillis believed 
the trial judge would not be receptive to 
such an objection. 
 
855 F. Supp. at 1404. 
 
 Furthermore, we agree with the district court, id., and 
the state Superior Court, Bailey JA at 23, that Bailey has not 
shown that his attorneys' failure to object at trial resulted in 
"prejudice" under the Strickland test -- i.e., that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  We also hold that failure to 
consider Bailey's argument would not "result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice."  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724.  Moreover, 
even if we were to consider Bailey's argument, we would concur 
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with the district court that Bailey has not shown that the 
prosecutor's comments "so infected the trial with unfairness as 
to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."  855 
F. Supp. at 1404 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 
637, 643 (1974)).  See also, e.g., Dardan v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
168, 181 (1986); Todaro v. Fulcomer, 944 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 909 (1992). 
  3.  Bailey's final argument concerning the guilt 
phase of his trial is that his constitutional right to due 
process was violated when the trial judge, in his jury 
instructions, described a "reasonable doubt" as a "substantial 
doubt."  Bailey contends that this instruction was 
unconstitutional under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
However, Bailey did not object to this instruction at trial, and 
the Delaware courts held in the post-conviction proceedings that 
his objection was procedurally barred under state law.  See 
Bailey JA at 26, 37a.  Bailey contends that he is nevertheless 
entitled to federal habeas review because he has demonstrated 
"cause" and "prejudice."  He maintains that "cause" was 
established because his attorneys' failure to object at trial 
constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance.  We hold 
that Bailey's reasonable doubt claim must be rejected. 
 We agree with the district court that federal habeas 
review of this claim is barred due to Bailey's procedural 
default.0  Although Bailey contends that the allegedly 
                     
0The district court also held, and the state has argued on 
appeal, that the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 
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ineffective assistance of his trial attorneys demonstrated 
"cause" for this default, we find this argument to be 
insubstantial.  Bailey's trial occurred long before Cage.  Just 
one year before Bailey's trial, the Delaware Supreme Court had 
approved an instruction virtually identical to the one given 
here.  See Wintjen v. State, 398 A.2d 780, 781 n.2 (Del. 1979). 
In addition, the use of the phrase "substantial doubt" was 
supported by federal case law.  See United States v. Smith, 468 
F.2d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Reasonable doubt of itself is 
substantial . . . .  It is sufficient if the jury understands 
reasonable doubt to mean `a real or substantial doubt' generated 
by the evidence or lack of it.").  Under the circumstances, the 
failure of Bailey's attorneys to object to the reference in the 
instructions to "substantial doubt" did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687-91.  Consequently, Bailey's attorneys did not render 
constitutionally ineffective assistance, and Bailey cannot show 
"cause" for the procedural default. 
                                                                  
489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989), precludes consideration of Bailey's 
Cage argument.  The question whether Cage may be applied 
retroactively in habeas proceedings has divided the courts of 
appeals.  Compare Skelton v. Whitley, 950 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 102 (1992) (not retroactive) 
with Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 177-78 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied. 115 S. Ct. 2281 (1995) (retroactive) and Nutter v. White, 
39 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).  While the question of 
retroactivity under Teague should be decided before reaching the 
merits of a habeas claim, see Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 
953 (1994), neither binding precedent nor logic seems to require 
that the question of retroactivity be considered prior to the 
question of procedural default.  Accordingly, we have turned 
first to the question of procedural default and have thus found 
it unnecessary to reach the complicated issues related to Teague. 
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 Moreover, failure to consider Bailey's claim will not 
result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," Coleman, 501 
U.S. at 750.  We find strong support for this holding in Viktor 
v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).  In Viktor, the Supreme 
Court held that due process was not violated by jury instructions 
that described reasonable doubt as follows: 
A reasonable doubt is an actual and 
substantial doubt arising from the evidence, 
from the facts or circumstances shown by the 
evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the 
part of the state, as distinguished from a 
doubt arising from mere possibility, from 
bare imagination, or from fanciful 
conjecture. 
 
Id. at 1249 (emphasis added).  The Court noted two definitions of 
the term "substantial":  "not seeming or imaginary" and "that 
specified to a large degree."  Id. (quoting Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, 2280 (2d ed. 1979)).  Finding the first 
definition "unexceptionable" but the latter ambiguous, the Court 
wrote: 
Any ambiguity, however, is removed by reading 
the phrase in the context of the sentence in 
which it appears:  "A reasonable doubt is an 
actual and substantial doubt . . . as 
distinguished from a doubt arising from mere 
possibility, from mere imagination, or from 
fanciful conjecture."  This explicit 
distinction between a substantial doubt and a 
fanciful conjecture was not present in the 
Cage instruction. 
 
Id. at 1250. 
 
 We find the challenged portion of the jury instructions 
in this case to be essentially the same as that in Viktor.  Here, 
the judge told the jury: 
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Reasonable doubt does not mean a vague, 
speculative or whimsical doubt, nor a mere 
possible doubt, but a substantial doubt and 
such a doubt as intelligent, reasonable and 
impartial men and women may honestly 
entertain after a careful and conscientious 
consideration of the evidence in the case. 
 
Bailey JA at 168-69.  Thus, just as the Viktor instruction 
contrasted a "substantial doubt" with "a doubt arising from a 
mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful 
conjecture," the instruction here contrasted a "substantial 
doubt" with "a mere possible doubt," "a vague, speculative" 
doubt, and a "whimsical doubt."  
 It is true that the Supreme Court in Viktor went on to 
observe that "[i]n any event," the instruction in that case 
provided an accurate, "alternative definition of reasonable 
doubt, a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate 
to act."  114 S. Ct. at 1250.  However, as Supreme Court's use of 
the phrase "in any event" suggests, we do not interpret the 
Court's opinion to mean that this alternative definition was 
essential to its holding.  Accordingly, we believe that Viktor 
supports the constitutionality of the challenged instruction in 
this case and, in any event, clearly shows that it did not result 
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
 
 B.  Penalty Phase.  Bailey contends that his death 
sentences should be overturned for two reasons in addition to 
those discussed in Parts II and III of this opinion. 
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  1.  First, Bailey argues that certain statements 
made by the prosecutors during opening and closing arguments at 
the penalty hearing violated his right to due process.  However, 
Bailey's attorneys did not object to any of these comments, and 
his argument concerning these remarks was held in the state post-
conviction proceedings to be barred for procedural default under 
state law.  Although Bailey contends that his attorneys' failure 
to object amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance and 
thus established "cause" for the procedural default, we agree 
with the district court, for essentially the same reasons 
explained in that court's opinion, that Bailey did not satisfy 
either prong of the Strickland test and that federal habeas 
review of this claim is therefore barred.  See 855 F. Supp. at 
1406. 
 2.  Second, Bailey maintains that the trial court 
violated his constitutional rights by instructing the jury at the 
penalty phase that, by virtue of its verdicts finding Bailey 
guilty of the first-degree murders of Gilbert and Clara 
Lambertson, it had already found the existence of one of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances -- engaging in a "course of 
conduct [that] resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where 
the deaths are a probable consequence of the defendant's 
conduct."  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209 (e)(1)k.   Relying on 
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984), Bailey argues that "a 
penalty hearing is `like a trial' on the issue of punishment." 
Bailey's Br. at 70.  Bailey then notes that due process prohibits 
the use of conclusive presumptions at a trial, see Sandstrom v. 
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Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and he likens the judge's 
instruction to a conclusive presumption.  He consequently argues 
that the court's instruction violated due process.    
 We see no merit in this argument.  The guilt and 
penalty phases of a capital trial are parts of a single 
proceeding, and there is no constitutional requirement that they 
be treated as if they were two entirely separate trials.  The 
Supreme Court has held that a state may constitutionally employ a 
plan that provides for the same jury to sit in both the guilt and 
penalty phases of a capital murder trial.  See Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180-81 (1986); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 160, 163 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, 
J.J.).  When such a plan is used, evidence that is admitted at 
the guilt phase may be considered by the jury at the penalty 
phase.  Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180-81.  Furthermore, the finding 
of a statutory aggravating circumstance may occur either at the 
guilt or penalty phase.  See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634 ("[W]e 
have indicated that the trier of fact must . . . find one 
`aggravating circumstance' (or its equivalent) at either the 
guilt or penalty phase."); Lowenfield  v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 
244-46 (1988).  We therefore see no federal constitutional error 
in the trial court's instructing the jury that its verdicts at 
the guilt phase (finding that Bailey had murdered Gilbert and 
Clara Lambertson) had already established the existence of one 
statutory aggravating circumstance (that his conduct had 
"resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths 
[were] the probable consequence of the defendant's conduct"). 
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 In any event, even if this instruction were erroneous, 
the error would be harmless.0  Since the jury had just found 
Bailey guilty of intentionally killing the two Lambertsons, there 
can be no reasonable doubt that, even if the challenged 
instruction had not been given, the jury would have found at the 
penalty phase that Bailey had engaged in conduct that caused the 
deaths of two people and that these deaths were the probable 
consequences of his conduct.0 
                     
0In an effort to suggest that the jury might not have found the 
existence of this statutory aggravating circumstance were it not 
for the challenged instruction, Bailey points out that the jury 
sent a note to the trial judge during its deliberations stating 
that it was "troubled somewhat with the word `probable' in the 
third statutory aggravating circumstance listed in [the] charge."  
Bailey JA at 200(A).  Bailey seems to suggest that this note 
revealed that the jury was not sure whether the deaths of the 
Lambertsons were the "probable" consequence of Bailey's conduct.  
This suggestion, however, appears far-fetched.  Since the same 
jury had found in the verdicts returned on Friday, February 22, 
1980, that Bailey had intentionally killed the Lambertsons, it is 
hard to see how the jury could doubt on Monday, February 25, 
1980, when the note was sent to the judge, that the Lambertsons' 
deaths were the probable consequences of Bailey's conduct. 
 
     There is a far more likely explanation for the jury's note: 
the jury may not have understood that the probability standard 
set out in the statutory aggravating circumstance was merely the 
minimum necessary.  In other words, since the evidence showed 
that Bailey shot both Lambertsons multiple times at close range 
with a shotgun and pistol and since the jury had already found 
that he intended to kill them, the jury may not have completely 
understood that the probability standard in the statutory 
aggravating circumstance could be satisfied by proof that the 
Lambertsons' deaths were not merely the probable consequences of 
Bailey's conduct but the intended and almost certain consequences 
of those actions.  Accordingly, we are convinced that any error 
was harmless. 
0In a habeas proceeding, the appropriate harmless error standard 
is "whether the error `had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict.'"  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). See also O'Neal v. 
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V. 
 In summary, we reject Bailey's and Flamer's arguments 
concerning the references in the jury instructions and 
interrogatories to certain vague or duplicative aggravating 
circumstances.  We also reject all of Bailey's remaining 
arguments.  Accordingly, the orders of the district court denying 
the petitions for writs of habeas corpus will be affirmed in both 
cases. 
                                                                  
McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).  That standard was plainly met 
here. 
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APPENDIX A 
Flamer Jury Instructions (Flamer JA at 1460-65) 
 
 I shall instruct you as to the applicable 
principles of law governing the punishment to be 
imposed in this case.  No single one of these 
instructions states all of the law applicable to this 
determination.  Therefore, you should listen to and 
consider all the instructions together.  You are to 
apply the law to these facts and in this way decide the 
punishment to be imposed in the case. 
 
 The criminal code says as follows:  "Upon a 
conviction of guilt of a defendant of first degree 
murder, the Superior Court shall conduct a separate 
hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be 
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without 
benefit of probation or parole. 
 
 "A sentence of death shall not be imposed until 
the jury finds: 
 
 "1.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstances; and 
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 "2.  Unanimously recommend, after weighing all 
relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which 
bears upon the particular circumstances or details of 
the commission of the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender, that a sentence of death 
be imposed.  Where the jury submits such a finding and 
recommendation, the Court will sentence the defendant 
to death.  A finding by the jury of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance, and a consequent 
recommendation of death, supported by the evidence, 
shall be binding on the Court." 
 
 The Delaware law specifies certain statutory 
aggravating circumstances which the State may contend 
exist in a particular case.  The law does not specify 
mitigating circumstances, but the defense may offer 
evidence relating to any mitigating circumstances which 
it contends exist in a particular case.  The State may 
likewise offer matters in aggravation besides the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
 
 An aggravating circumstance is a factor which 
tends to make the defendant's conduct more serious, or  
 
 
- i- 
58 
 
the imposition of a penalty of death appropriate.  A  
 mitigating circumstance is any factor which tends to 
make the defendant's conduct less serious, or the 
imposition of a penalty of death inappropriate. 
 
 In this case the State contends that the following 
four statutory aggravating circumstances exist: 
 
 1.  The murder was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in the commission of robbery. 
 
 2.  The defendant's course of conduct resulted in 
the deaths of two or more persons where the deaths are 
a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 
 
 3.  The murders were outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible or inhuman. 
 
 4.  The murders were committed for pecuniary gain. 
 
 You cannot recommend that this defendant be 
sentenced to death unless you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance exists. 
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 In this regard an applicable portion of the 
Delaware law provides that in any case where the 
defendant has been convicted of murder in the first 
degree in violation of 11 Delaware Code, Section 
636(a)(2) that conviction shall establish the existence 
of a statutory aggravating circumstance. 
 
 In this case the defendant has been convicted of 
violating 11 Delaware Code, Section 636(a)(2) which 
reads:  "Murder in the first degree.  A person is 
guilty of murder in the first degree when in the course 
of and in furtherance of the commission of a felony, he 
recklessly causes the death of another person." 
 
 Therefore, that statutory aggravating 
circumstances has been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and you are so instructed. 
 
 The law provides that a sentence of death shall 
not be imposed unless you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
and unanimously recommend, after weighing all relevant  
 
- ii - 
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evidence in aggravation, including but not limited to 
the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances 
that you have already found to exist, and mitigation 
which bears upon the particular circumstances or 
details of the commission of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender, that a 
sentence of death be imposed.  You are to weigh any 
mitigating factors against the aggravating factors to 
determine the penalty. 
 
 If you have a reasonable doubt about the existence 
of any statutory aggravating circumstance, you must 
give the defendant the benefit of that reasonable doubt 
and find that the statutory aggravating circumstance 
does not exist. 
 
 I would remind you a reasonable doubt means a 
doubt based upon good and sufficient reasons and common 
sense. 
 
 Your unanimous recommendation for the imposition 
of the death penalty, if supported by the evidence, is 
binding on the Court.  Similarly, if you are not 
unanimous in your recommendation to impose the death 
penalty, or you cannot agree unanimously as to your 
recommendations, then the Court is bound to impose a 
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sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of 
probation or parole. 
 
 In conclusion, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless you, the jury, find beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
has been established and unanimously recommend a 
sentence of death be imposed after weighing all 
relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation which 
bear upon the particular circumstances and details of 
the commission of the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender. 
 
 Should you fail to agree unanimously to either of 
these two matters, the Court shall sentence the 
defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of 
probation or parole. 
 
 As I have previously instructed, you have found a 
statutory aggravating circumstance by returning 
verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree in 
violation of 11 Delaware Code, Section 636(a)(2), 
recklessly causing the death during commission of a 
felony.  You will be given a written interrogatory on 
which to indicate if you find any additional statutory  
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aggravating circumstance.  If you do not unanimously  
find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any 
additional aggravating circumstance, you should 
indicate accordingly. 
 
 You will next indicate on the written 
interrogatory that will be given to you whether the 
jury unanimously recommends that a death sentence be 
imposed. 
 
 If you recommend the death penalty, you will then 
indicate on the written interrogatory which statutory 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances, including 
the violation of 11 Delaware Code, Section 636(a)(2), 
you relied upon in reaching your decision. 
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APPENDIX B 
Flamer Jury Interrogatories (Flamer Rec. at 30) 
 
 1.  Does the jury unanimously find that the following 
statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist? 
 
(a)  The defendant's course of conduct resulted in the 
deaths of two or more persons where the deaths are a 
probable consequence of the defendant's conduct? 
 
   Yes    x     No        
 
(b)  The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman? 
 
   Yes    x     No        
 
(c)  The murder was committed for pecuniary gain? 
    
   Yes    x        No        
 
 2.  Does the jury unanimously recommend that a sentence 
of death be imposed: 
       
   Yes    x     No.        
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 3.  If the jury unanimously recommends that a sentence 
of death be imposed, please indicate which statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances were relied upon: 
 
(a)  The murder was committed while the defendant was 
engaged in the commission of a robbery. 
 
   Yes    x    No        
 
(b)  The defendant's course of conduct resulted in the 
deaths of two or more persons where the deaths are a 
probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 
 
   Yes    x    No        
 
(c)  The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman. 
 
   Yes    x     No        
 
(d)  The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 
 
   Yes    x    No         
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APPENDIX C 
Bailey Jury Instructions (Bailey Tr. of 2/25/1980  
at 270-75)  
 I shall now instruct you as to the applicable 
principles of law governing the punishment to be 
imposed in this case.  No single one of these 
instructions states all of the law applicable to this 
determination; therefore you must listen to and 
consider all of these instructions together.  You are 
to apply the law to the facts and in this way decide 
the punishment to be imposed in the case. 
 
 The criminal code provides as follows: 
 
 "Upon a conviction of guilt of a defendant of 
first degree murder, the Superior Court shall conduct a 
separate hearing to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment 
without benefit of probation or parole or any other 
reduction. 
 
 "A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless 
the jury finds: 
 
 "1.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstances; and, 
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 "2.  Unanimously recommend, after weighing all 
relevant evidenced in aggravation or mitigation which 
bears upon the particular circumstances or details of 
the commission of the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender, that a sentence of death 
be imposed.  Where the jury submits such a finding and 
recommendation, the Court shall sentence the defendant 
to death.  A finding by the jury of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance, and a consequent 
recommendation of death supported by the evidence, 
shall be binding on the Court." 
 
 The Delaware law specifies certain statutory 
aggravating circumstances which the State may contend 
exist in a particular case.  The law does not specify 
mitigating circumstances, but the defense may offer 
evidence relating to mitigating circumstances which it 
contends exist in a particular case.  The State may 
likewise offer matters in aggravation besides the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
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 An aggravating circumstance is a factor which 
tends to make the defendant's conduct more serious or 
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the imposition of a penalty of death appropriate.  A 
mitigating circumstance is any factor which tends to 
make the defendant's conduct less serious or the 
imposition of a penalty of death inappropriate. 
 
 In this case, the State contends the following 
four statutory aggravating circumstances exist: 
 
 1.  The murders were committed by one who had 
escaped from a place of confinement. 
 
 2.  The murders were committed while the defendant 
was engaged in flight after committing robbery. 
 
 3.  The defendant's course of conduct resulted in 
the deaths of two persons where the deaths were a 
probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 
 
 4.  The murders were outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible or inhuman. 
 
 You cannot recommend this defendant be sentenced 
to death unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. 
 
 You have already convicted the defendant of 
causing the death of two persons; therefore, that 
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aggravating circumstance has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt and you are so instructed. 
 
 The law provides that a sentence of death shall 
not be imposed unless you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
and unanimously recommend, after weighing all relevant 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation which bears upon 
the particular circumstances or details of the 
commission of the offense and the character and 
propensities of the offender that a sentence of death 
be imposed.  You are to weigh any mitigating factors 
against the aggravating factors to determine the 
penalty. 
 
 If you have a reasonable doubt about the existence 
of any statutory aggravating circumstance, you must 
give the defendant the benefit of that reasonable doubt 
and find that that statutory aggravating circumstance 
does not exist. 
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 I would remind you that reasonable doubt means a 
doubt based upon good and sufficient reason and common 
sense. 
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 Your unanimous recommendation for the imposition 
of the death penalty, if supported by the evidence, is 
binding on the Court.  Similarly, if you are not 
unanimous in your recommendation to impose the death 
penalty, or you cannot agree unanimously as to your 
recommendation, then the Court is bound to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of 
probation or parole. 
 
 In conclusion, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless, the jury, find: 
 
 1.  Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
established; and 
 
 2.  Unanimously recommend that a sentence of death 
be imposed after weighing all relevant evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation which bear upon the 
particular circumstances and details of the commission 
of the offense and the character and propensities of 
the offender. 
 
 Should you fail to agree unanimously to either of 
those two matters, the Court shall sentence the 
defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of 
probation or parole. 
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 As I have previously instructed, you have found a 
statutory aggravating circumstance by returning 
verdicts of guilty of causing the death of two persons. 
You will be given a written interrogatory on which to 
indicate if you find any statutory aggravating 
circumstances.  If you do not unanimously find beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating 
circumstance, you should indicate accordingly. 
 
 If you find one or more aggravating circumstance, 
you should next indicate on th_! 
